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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
REAVLEY, Circuit Judge. 
 
Edward and Nancy Kabakjian appeal a take-nothing 
judgment in their suit against the federal government and 





The Kabakjians sued the government after property they 
owned was seized and sold at an auction to recoup unpaid 
income taxes. The Kabakjians do not dispute the 
underlying tax obligation. Their complaint alleged that the 
government failed to comply with 26 U.S.C. S 6335, which 
governs the seizure of property to cover unpaid taxes. 
 
Count 1 of the complaint sought to quiet title to the 
property. Counts 2 and 3 sought money damages for the 
wrongful seizure of the property and for failing to release 
liens on the property. The Kabakjians moved for partial 
summary judgment, arguing that the notices they received 
under S 6335 were defective because they were delivered by 
certified mail rather than by personal delivery. The 
government moved to dismiss count 1 for lack of subject 
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matter jurisdiction. The district court agreed with the 
government and dismissed count 1, holding that the 
government was immune from suit on this count. The 
district court discussed the "substantial compliance" 
provision found at 26 U.S.C. S 6339(b)(2), which we discuss 
below, but as we read the district court's ruling it 
ultimately held, as to count 1, that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
 
The court later granted a summary judgment on the 
remaining federal claims for damages, and dismissed the 
pendent state law claims. The Kabakjians do not argue on 
appeal that the district court erred in dismissing the state 
law claims and in dismissing count 3, which alleged money 
damages caused by the government's failure to release its 
liens on the property. We therefore consider whether the 
district court correctly ruled against appellants on the 
claims they asserted in counts 1 and 2. 
 
The record discloses that on December 11, 1995, the 
government sent to the Kabakjians, at their personal 
residence, a notice of seizure of the property in issue. This 
notice was sent by certified mail. The Kabakjians received 
this notice. On December 17, 1995, the IRS seized the 
property. On January 24, 1996, the government sent the 
Kabakjians a notice of a sealed bid sale of the property, 
stating that the sale would take place February 23, 1996. 
Again, there is no dispute that the Kabakjians received this 
notice, which was again sent by certified mail. On February 
23 the sale took place. On September 18, 1996, after the 
expiration of a statutory 180-day redemption period, see 26 
U.S.C. S 6337(b)(1), the government conveyed the Kabakjian 
title to the third parties by written deed. On September 19, 
1997, this suit was filed. 
 
The Kabakjians claim that the notices were defective 
because they were sent by certified mail and the relevant 
statute requires personal delivery. Under 26 U.S.C. 
S 6335(a) a notice of seizure 
 
       in writing shall be given by the Secretary to the owner 
       of the property . . . or shall be left at his usual place 
       of abode or business if he has such within the internal 
       revenue district where the seizure is made. If the owner 
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       cannot be readily located, or has no dwelling or place 
       of business within such district, the notice may be 
       mailed to his last know address. 
 
Section 6335(b) requires a notice of sale, to be given in the 
same manner as the notice of seizure specified inS 6335(a). 
In the pending case a notice of seizure under S 6335(a) and 
a notice of sale under S 6335(b) were sent to the home of 
the Kabakjians, but the notices were sent by certified mail 
rather than hand delivery. 
 
The statute does not explicitly require hand delivery of 
the notices, but since it requires notice "to the owner" or 
notice at the residence or business, and alternatively allows 
for notice by mail only if the owner cannot be located or he 
lacks a home or business in the district, courts have 
interpreted the statute to require notice by hand delivery, 
and to allow for notice by mail only if the attempt at hand 
delivery fails. See Goodwin v. United States, 935 F.2d 1061, 
1064 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The government concedes that under 
a literal reading of S 6335, service by certified mail, as 
received by Goodwin, is defective."). The government 
concedes that delivery of the notices by certified mail 
violates the statute. 
 




Absent an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity, the 
federal government cannot be sued and the district court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim against the government. 
United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990); Clinton 
County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 
1997). Regarding the quiet title claim asserted in count 1, 
we conclude that the government was not immune from 
suit. 
 
Under 28 U.S.C. S 2410(a), "the United States may be 
named a party in any civil action or suit in any district 
court . . . to quiet title to . . . real or personal property on 
which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other 
lien." In the pending case, the government had seized and 
sold the property before the suit was filed. Other courts 
have held that the federal district courts lack jurisdiction to 
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hear a quiet title action against the government if the 
government has sold the subject property to a third party 
prior to the time plaintiff files suit. See Koehler v. United 
States, 153 F.3d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 1998), and cases cited 
therein. 
 
However, the record in the pending case indicates that 
the government filed federal tax liens on all of appellants' 
property, and did not release these liens until it prepared a 
"Certificate of Release of Federal Tax Lien" on November 2, 
1998, after the Kabakjians filed suit. See 26 U.S.C. S 6321 
(providing for tax lien on all property of taxpayer after 
demand and refusal to pay tax); 26 U.S.C. S 6325 (providing 
for issuance of certificate of release of lien). The seizure of 
the property and sale to third parties, which took place 
before this suit was filed, did not purport to release the 
then-existing tax liens. The deed from the government to 
the third parties only purported to convey the interest of 
the Kabakjians in the property. It did not purport to convey 
the government's interest or release the federal tax liens on 
the property. The county real property records did not 
indicate that the lien on the property had been released 
until, after this suit was filed, the government prepared and 
filed its certificate of release of lien. 
 
The existence of the federal tax liens, in our view, vested 
the district court with jurisdiction to hear the quiet title 
claim. This result is consistent with our decision in Aqua 
Bar & Lounge, Inc. v. United States, 539 F.2d 935 (3d Cir. 
1976). There we held that the district court had jurisdiction 
to hear a quiet title case where the plaintiff claimed that the 
government had failed to comply with S 6335 procedural 
requirements when it seized and sold his personal property. 
Id. at 936, 939-40. The property in question was a liquor 
license. Id. at 936. We held that the suit was properly 
treated "as an action to quiet title to property on which the 
United States has a lien," and noted the existence of the tax 
lien at the time of the proceedings below. Id.  at 937. 
 
A related, thornier question is whether the district court 
retained jurisdiction after the government issued the 
certificate of release of tax lien on November 2, 1998. This 
release was issued after suit was filed but before the 
district court ruled on the government's motion to dismiss 
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count 1 and motion for summary judgment and entered a 
final judgment. We hold that the district court retained 
jurisdiction even after the government released the federal 
tax lien. 
 
We have recognized as a general principle that 
jurisdiction is determined at the time the suit is filed. New 
Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, 
Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1503 (3d Cir. 1996). However, we 
noted in New Rock that this principle is most often 
recognized in diversity cases and "has been applied only 
rarely to federal question cases." Id. Even in diversity cases 
the rule admits to at least one exception, as 28 U.S.C. 
S 1447(e) provides that "[i]f after removal the plaintiff seeks 
to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy 
subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or 
permit joinder and remand the action to the State court." 
Hence, a district court can sometimes, after suit is filed, 
permit the destruction of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
There is also a provision of the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 
S 2409a, which gives us pause. This Act provides that "[t]he 
United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil 
action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to 
real property in which the United States claims an 
interest." Id. S 2409a(a). The federal district courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought underS 2409a. 
28 U.S.C. S 1346(f). However, the Quiet Title Act goes on to 
provide: 
 
       If the United States disclaims all interest in the real 
       property or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff at 
       any time prior to the actual commencement of the trial, 
       which disclaimer is confirmed by order of the court, the 
       jurisdiction of the district court shall cease  unless it 
       has jurisdiction of the civil action or suit on ground 
       other than and independent of the authority conferred 
       by section 1346(f) of this title. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2409a(e) (emphasis added). 
 
Subsection (e) of the Quiet Title Act can be read to 
provide that the government can, after suit is filed, sell the 
property in issue and thereby divest the district court of 
jurisdiction. Some courts have suggested otherwise, 
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although they discuss the Quiet Title Act generally without 
focusing on subsection (e). See Delta Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
IRS, 847 F.2d 248, 249 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988); Bank of Hemet 
v. United States, 643 F.2d 661, 664-65 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 
Regardless, the Quiet Title Act is not applicable to the 
pending suit, since it expressly provides that it does not 
apply to "actions which may be or could have been brought 
under sections . . . 2410 of this title . . . ." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2409a(a). Both sides agree that S 2410 is applicable to the 
pending suit, as it applies to actions "to quiet title to . . . 
real or personal property on which the United States has or 
claims a mortgage or other lien." In this case, the 
government seized and sold the property in issue pursuant 
to a tax lien. Moreover, Congress chose, for whatever 
reason, to include subsection (e) in the Quiet Title Act and 
failed to include an analogous provision in S 2410, the more 
narrowly drawn statute. This is, we think, a case where "a 
precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general 
remedies." Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 
834 (1976). We therefore follow the general rule for 
determining jurisdiction, and conclude that jurisdiction 
under S 2410 is determined by looking to the facts existing 
at the time the suit was filed. The government cannot 
thereafter divest the court of jurisdiction by selling the 
property in issue or releasing its lien on the property. See 
Kulawy v. United States, 917 F.2d 729, 733-34 (2d Cir. 
1990) (holding that government cannot "oust the court of 
jurisdiction validly invoked" under S 2410 by selling the 
property on which it had a lien at the time suit was 
commenced). 
 
2. Merits of Quiet Title Claim 
 
Although we conclude that the district court had 
jurisdiction to hear the quiet title claim, we nevertheless 
hold that the claim was properly dismissed. We may affirm 
a judgment on any ground apparent from the record, even 
if the district court did not reach it. See Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 205 F.3d 615, 
635 (3d Cir. 2000). Although there was a failure to comply 
with the notice requirements of 26 U.S.C. S 6335 because 
the Kabakjians received the required notices by certified 
mail rather than personal delivery, the record shows that 
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the Kabakjians received actual notice of the seizure and 
notice of the planned sale of the property. We hold that the 
notices were not so defective as to void the seizure of the 
property and its transfer to a third parties. Under 26 U.S.C. 
S 6339(b)(2), where a deed to real property conveys property 
seized under S 6335, such a deed operates as a conveyance 
of all the delinquent taxpayer's right, title and interest in 
the property so long as the proceedings "have been 
substantially in accordance with the provisions of law." The 
Kabakjians rely on Kulawy v. United States, 917 F.2d 729 
(2d Cir. 1990) but that case involved the sale of personal 
property not covered by this substantial compliance 
provision. 
 
Section 6339(b)(2) therefore provides that title transfers if 
there has been substantial compliance with the notice and 
other procedures set out in S 6335. The Kabakjians received 
actual notice under S 6335, and although the issue was 
joined below they failed to show that they were 
meaningfully prejudiced by receipt of the S 6335 notices by 
certified mail instead of personal delivery. For example, 
when Mr. Kabakjian was asked in his deposition how he 
was prejudiced by receipt of the notice of sale by mail 
rather than personal delivery, he answered that"[a]ny time 
a citizen's rights are denied they are being prejudiced." Mrs. 
Kabakjian testified that she agreed with the statement that 
she had "no independent information or claim for damages 
other than what your husband has told you." We hold that 
there was substantial compliance with S 6335, and that 
under 6339(b)(2), all title to the property once vested in the 
Kabakjians therefore transferred. Their quiet title claim 
therefore fails on the merits. 
 
B. Claims for Damages 
 
The Kabakjians sought money damages for the allegedly 
defective seizure and sale of their property. Again, they do 
not deny that they owed back taxes. 
 
Under 26 U.S.C. S 7433(a), a cause of action lies where 
an IRS employee recklessly or intentionally disregards any 
provision of the Internal Revenue Code. Under S 7433(b), 
the taxpayer can recover his "actual, direct economic 
damages sustained" as a "proximate result" of an IRS 
employee's improper actions under S 7433(a). 
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The count 2 claim for damages is based on the alleged 
violations of S 6335. As discussed above, on December 11, 
1995, the government sent by certified mail to the 
Kabakjians a notice of seizure of the property. On 
December 17, the IRS seized the property. On January 24, 
1996, the government sent the Kabakjians by certified mail 
a notice of a sealed bid sale of the property, stating that the 
sale would take place February 23, 1996. There is no 
dispute that the Kabakjians received the notices. On 
February 23 the sale took place. 
 
In this case no attempt at hand delivery of the notices 
was made, as required by S 6335. However, the purpose of 
the notice requirements was met, since the Kabakjians 
received actual notice. They did not show "actual, direct 
economic damages sustained" as a "proximate result" of the 
technical noncompliance with the statutory notice 
requirements. Accordingly summary judgment was properly 
granted on the money damages claim. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be AFFIRMED. 
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